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Case No. 20090149
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Clay Lowe,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a
third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court correctly rule that the officer's protective search for
weapons was lawful?
Standard of review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual
findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress.
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal
conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application
of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 12,103 P.3d 699.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004). Rl.
Defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine, which was seized pursuant to
a warrantless search. R44-37, 82-64. Following oral argument on the motion, the
trial court denied the motion in a written ruling. R98-95 (a copy is attached in
addendum A). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Defendant pled guilty on the
condition that he could appeal the trial court's ruling. R106; see also R102. The trial
court imposed the statutory prison term of from zero to five years. R131-30. The
trial court then stayed imposition of the prison term and placed Defendant on a 36month term of probation. Id. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R168.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The trial court adopted the facts as set forth in the State's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress. See R97; see also R60-58 (copies are
attached in the addendum).
1. On February 24, 2008, Utah County Sheriffs Deputy Deke Taylor
made contact with Timothy Lamoreaux at the defendant's residence,
intending to question [Lamoreaux] as to the whereabouts of a fugitive
with whom Lamoreaux was believed to associate.
2. As Deputy Taylor approached the defendant's apartment,
Lamoreaux was standing in an outside doorway. When Deputy Taylor
identified himself, Lamoreaux placed his left hand in his pocket.
Deputy Taylor ordered Lamoreaux to keep his hands where he could
see them and to come out of the doorway, but Lamoreaux refused and
then reached into his right front pants pocket. Taylor again ordered
Lamoreaux to keep his hands visible, but Lamoreaux did not comply.
As a result of Lamoreaux's failure to comply with the order to keep his
hands out of his pockets, Deputy Taylor pulled Lamoreaux out of the
doorway and onto the ground. Deputy Taylor then searched
Lamoreaux and found a butterfly knife with a six-inch blade in his
right front pants pocket. Lamoreaux's possession of the knife was
illegal because he is a category-two restricted person.
3. Just after Deputy Taylor forced Lamoreaux to the ground, Provo
Police Officer Troy Morgan arrived, having been dispatched to assist
with a warrant service. Officer Morgan heard Deputy Taylor yelling as
he approached the area. When he arrived, he saw Deputy Taylor with
his gun out, one individual on the ground and at least one other
individual (the defendant herein) present and unrestrained. Officer
Morgan accordingly made contact with the defendant. As he did so,
Deputy Taylor was removing the knife from Lamoreaux's pants
pocket. At that moment, the defendant "turned into" Officer Morgan,
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immediately causing Officer Morgan to suspect that the defendant also
had a weapon and to fear for his safety, f1]
4. Officer Morgan performed a Terry frisk on the defendant's outer
clothing, noticing a hard cylindrical object in defendant's left front
pocket. Although Officer Morgan did not believe the object was a gun,
he was concerned that he was feeling the handle of a knife. Because he
could not readily determine whether the object was a weapon, Officer
Morgan removed the object from the defendant's pocket. As he
removed the object, a baggie containing a crystal substance also fell out
of the defendant's pocket. At this point, Officer Morgan saw that the
object was a prescription medication bottle, and this initial impression
of the baggie was that it contained methamphetamine.
5. The crystal substance field tested positive for methamphetamine
and weighed 1.16 grams. The defendant admitted buying the
methamphetamine from Lamoreaux just before officers arrived.
R60-58.

1

Officer Morgan testified at the preliminary hearing that he received a call
from "dispatch to assist. . . with a possible warrants service." R172:5. Dispatch
advised "that the officers on the scene wanted us to park short, and to walk into the
location, due to the individual that they were going make contact with has a flight
risk, and is also a violent person, and will resist officers at the scene." Id. at 5-6. As
Officer Morgan approached the scene, he heard "an officer yelling, 'Stop resisting.
Show me your hands. Get on the ground,' several times " Id. at 6. Officer Morgan
believed the officer yelling "was in some sort of trouble, that he was being fought
with." Id. Officer Morgan was immediately concerned for officer safety and ran
toward the sound of the melee, where he saw Defendant standing about four or five
feet away, with his hands up. Id. at 7. Defendant stood between Officer Morgan
and Lamoreaux, who was on the ground, and Deputy Taylor. Id. Deputy Taylor
was holding both Lamoreaux and Defendant at gunpoint. Id. at 14; see also id. at 17
(affirming Deputy Taylor was attempting to control Lamoreaux with one hand
while holding a gun on Defendant with his other hand).
4

Based on these findings, the trial court ruled that under the totality of the
circumstances, Officer Morgan was justified in performing a weapons frisk on
Defendant. R97. Specifically, Officer Morgan heard Deputy Taylor yelling as he
approached, and upon arriving at the scene, saw Deputy "Taylor with his gun out,
Defendant with his hands in the air, and Lamoreaux not complying." Id. Moreover,
at the same moment that Deputy Taylor discovered a butterfly knife on Lamoreaux,
Defendant made a 180 degree turn toward Officer Morgan. Id. The trial court thus
concluded that Officer Morgan was justified in fearing that Defendant may also
have a knife, or that he may be armed and dangerous. Id. Finally, the trial court
ruled that the methamphetamine fell from Defendant's pocket when, after Officer
Morgan patted what he reasonably believed "could be a knife handle/' he retrieved
the object only to find that it was a pill bottle. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A protective weapons search is justified where the facts and circumstances
known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences drawn by the officer
based on his or her experience and training, give rise to a reasonable belief that the
suspect may be armed and dangerous. The trial court correctly concluded that
Officer Morgan's protective weapons search of Defendant was supported by
reasonable suspicion. Officer Morgan was dispatched to Defendant's residence to
5

assist Deputy Taylor, who was attempting to talk to Lamoreaux, who was known to
be a violent person. As Officer Morgan approached the residence, he heard Deputy
Taylor yelling, and saw the deputy attempting to control Lamoreaux with one hand
while holding a gun on Defendant with his other hand. Moreover, at the same time
Deputy Taylor discovered a butterfly knife on Lamereaux's person, Defendant, who
was standing between Deputy Taylor and Officer Morgan, turned 180 degrees into
Officer Morgan, causing to him to be concerned that Defendant may also have a
knife. These facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom combined to create
reasonable suspicion that Defendant, like Lamoreaux, was armed and dangerous.
ARGUMENT
OFFICER MORGAN'S PROTECTIVE SEARCH FOR WEAPONS
WAS LAWFUL
The sole question on appeal is whether the facts known to Officer Morgan
justified a weapons search of Defendant's person. The trial court concluded that
they did:
I find that under the totality of the circumstances, with the other officer
there, having had a gun raised, holding the two men at bay, for all
[Officer Morgan] knew, and eventually taking Mr. Lamoreaux to the
ground and finding indeed a weapon that Mr. Lamoreaux seemed to
be hiding, and then the movement of [Defendant] at that same time,
turning 180 degree at a point where he had his hands in the air — and I
think that can possibly cut both ways. He's got his hands in the air
because he's got a gun pointed at him at some point, but also it puts
6

him in a position as he turns on the officer to do something with those
hands that are in the air.
R181:17; see also R98-97. The trial court's conclusion was correct. Accordingly, this
Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 24 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
held that where an officer has reason to believe that a lawfully detained person
"may be armed and presently dangerous/' the officer may "conduct a carefully
limited search of the [person's] outer clothing" to determine "whether the person is
in fact carrying a weapon." Accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, If 13,78 P.3d 590. A
protective frisk may not be based on an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, at % 14. The officer must
have "some minimal level of objective justification." INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
217 (1984). Indeed, the officer "must be able to point to sppcific facts which,
considered with rational inferences from those facts," give rise to a reasonable belief
2

Defendant cites to both the state and federal constitutions, but he engages in
no state constitutional analysis. See Aplt. Br. at 2, 4, 9-10. His reliance on the state
constitution is thus nominal. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f 14,122 P.3d
506 (Utah 2005) ("[W]e are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional issues
which have not been properly preserved, framed, and briefed"), overruled on other
grounds, 5A7 U.S. 398 (2006); see also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,1248 n.5 (Utah
1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless
an argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is
briefed.").
7

that the person may be presently armed or may gain immediate control of a
weapon. Warren, 2003 UT 36, at ^f 14 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). In assessing
reasonable suspicion, officers may "draw upon their own experience and training to
make determinations based on the cumulative facts before them that may elude an
untrained person/7 Id. (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002)).
In determining whether a particular protective search was justified, the
overarching question is "whether 'the facts available to the officer at the moment of.
.. the search, "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action
taken was appropriate/" Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 2122) (internal citation omitted). In other words, the search must be judged against an
objective standard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at ^

14, 16.

"Courts must. . . avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in
isolation from each other." Warren, 2003 UT 36, at % 14 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
274). Instead, they "must view the articulable facts in their totality." Id. And
although the review court applies an objective standard, it must give "due weight to
the specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts
in light of his experience." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, at H 2021 (recognizing that "an officer's own evaluation of the circumstances," based on his
or her training and experience, "factor[s] into the objective analysis").
8

Here, the totality of the circumstances support that Officer Morgan was
justified in performing the protective search of Defendant's person. As found by the
trial court, Deputy Taylor wanted to talk to Lamoreaux, who was standing in an
outside doorway, about a fugitive with whom Lamoreaux was believed to associate.
R59. However, when Deputy Taylor identified himself and attempted to initiate the
voluntary encounter, Lamoreaux placed his left hand in his pocket. R59; see also
State v. Adams, 2007 UT App 117,1f 10,158 P.3d 1134 ("A level one encounter is a
voluntary encounter during which a citizen may choose to answer a police officer's
questions but is free to leave at any time during the questioning"). The deputy
" ordered Lamoreaux to keep his hands where he could see them and to come out of
the doorway, but Lamoreaux refused and then reached into his right front pants
pocket." Id. "[Deputy] Taylor again ordered Lamoreaux to keep his hands visible,
but Lamoreaux did not comply." Id. Given Lamoreaux's threatening behavior, and
fearing for his safety, Deputy Taylor pulled Lamoreaux from the doorway and to
the ground. Id.; see also R97. Because a person of reasonable caution would be
concerned for his safety in this circumstance, a weapons frisk of Lamoreaux's
person was justified. See Teriy, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (officer action reasonable where
facts "'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
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appropriate'"). That frisk revealed a butterfly knife with a six-inch blade in
Lamoreaux's right front pants pocket. R59.
Almost simultaneously with the discovery of the butterfly knife on
Lamoreaux's person, Officer Morgan came on the scene. Officer Morgan knew that
Lamoreaux was a dangerous person, and that Deputy Taylor was attempting to talk
to him at Defendant's residence. See Rl72:5-6; see also R59. As Officer Morgan
approached, he heard Deputy Taylor yelling repeatedly to Lamoreaux, "'Stop
resisting. Show me your hands. Get on the ground.'" R172:6. As he got closer,
Officer Morgan saw Deputy Taylor attempting to control Lamoreaux, who was on
the ground, with one hand while holding a gun on Defendant with his other hand.
Id. at 6-7. Moreover, as found by the trial court, at the same time Deputy Taylor
discovered the butterfly knife on Lamereaux's person, Defendant, who was
standing between the officers, turned 180 degrees into Officer Morgan, causing to
him to be concerned that Defendant may also have a knife. R97; see also R59.
Finally, even though Defendant and Lamoreaux were discovered outside
Defendant's house, rather than inside a "relatively small automobile," an objectively
reasonable person could have concluded that they were "engaged in a common
enterprise ... and ha[d] the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of
[any] wrongdoing.'" Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,373 (2003) (quoting Wyoming
10

v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999)). Given these facts, and the reasonable
inferences therefrom, the trial court properly ruled that Officer Morgan had
reasonable suspicion that Defendant, like Lamoreaux, was armed and dangerous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 29 October 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

JmZ^
MARIAN DECKER

assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
(Regarding Defendant's Motion to Suppress)

vs.
Case No. 081400641
CLAY LOWE,
Judge: Claudia Laycock
Defendant.

Oral Argument on the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence in this matter was held on
August 20, 2008. The Court made its ruling at that time in open court. Plaintiff appeared through
and was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney Julia Thomas. Defendant appeared in person
and was represented by Shelden Carter. The court reviewed the memoranda of law filed by
Defendant and Plaintiff, heard oral arguments from both parties, and sought clarification directly
from counsel. Now, being fully advised in the premises and legal issues, the Court enters the
following factualfindings,conclusions of law, and order regarding the Defendant's motion:

0 'J b J

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Court enters the following regarding Defendant's motion:
The parties agreed that the facts set forth in the State's Opposition to the Defendant's Motion
to Suppress were accurate. The Court therefore adopts those facts for purposes of this
motion.
The Court is required to look objectively at the totality of the circumstances.

Those

circumstances and their legal relevance include:
That Deputy Taylor's fear for officers' safety, based on Lamoreaux's failure to comply with
repeated orders to keep his hands visible, we^rwell-founded. The initial detention of Lowe,
who wras with Lamoreaux, was therefore lawful
That Officer Morgan, upon his arrival, saw Taylor with his gun out, Lowe with his hands up,
and Lamoreaux not complying. When Lowe turned 180 degrees to face Morgan as a
butterfly knife was discovered on Lamoreaux, Morgan was justified in feeling that Lowe
could also have a weapon. A Terry frisk was appropriate.
That Morgan, patting Lowe's clothing, felt a hard object in Lowe's pocket that he thought
could be a knife handle. Because he could not rule out the object being a knife, he pulled it
out of Lowe's pocket Morgan did not know the object was a bottle until he pulled it out.
The baggie containing a controlled substance came out with the bottle.
Under the totality of these circumstances and especially given the volatility of the situation,
the detention and subsequent Terry frisk were lawfully conducted.

03!j

ORDER
Having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court DENIES
the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
On this

day of

^ JrirCMAJH/i-'

, 2008.

BY THE COURT:

tL

Claudia Laycock f;
District Court Judg$# - I'E
Approved as to form:

L. Au}.^

&*

ItP^te/

Depmv btah County Attorney

•-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 081400641
CLAY LOWE,
Judge: Claudia Laycock
Defendant.
Comes now the State, by and through counsel, Julia Thomas, and respectfully requests this
Court DENY Defendant's motion to suppress.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
All facts below are derivedfromthe police reports in this and the accompanying case (copies
attached hereto), as well as testimonyfromthe preliminary hearing held July 16, 2008.
1.

On February 24,2008, Utah County Sheriff s Deputy Deke Taylor made contact with

Timothy Lamoreaux at the defendant's residence, intending to question him as to the whereabouts
-1-
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of a fugitive with whom Lamoreaux was believed to associate.
2.

As Deputy Taylor approached the defendant's apartment, Lamoreaux was standing

in an outside doorway. When Deputy Taylor identified himself, Lamoreaux placed his left hand in
his pocket. Deputy Taylor ordered Lamoreaux to keep his hands where he could see them and to
come out of the doorway, but Lamoreax refused and then reached into his right front pants pocket.
Taylor again ordered Lamoreaux to keep his hands visible, but Lamoreaux did not comply. As a
result of Lamoreaux's failure to comply with the order to keep his hands out of his pockets, Deputy
Taylor pulled Lamoreaux out of the doorway and onto the ground. Deputy Taylor then searched
Lamoreaux and found a butterfly knife with a six-inch blade in his right front pants pocket.
Lamoreaux' s possession of the knife was illegal because he is a category-two restricted person.
3.

Just after Deputy Taylor forced Lamoreaux to the ground, Provo Police Officer Troy

Morgan arrived, having been dispatched to assist with a warrant service. Officer Morgan heard
Deputy Taylor yelling as he approached the area. When he arrived, he saw Deputy Taylor with his
gun out, one individual on the ground and at least one other individual (the defendant herein) present
and unrestrained.

Officer Morgan accordingly made contact with the defendant. As he did so,

Deputy Taylor was removing the knife from Lamoreaux's pants pocket. At that moment, the
defendant "turned into" Officer Morgan, immediately causing Officer Morgan to suspect that the
defendant also had a weapon and to fear for his safety.
4.

Officer Morgan performed a Terry frisk on the defendant's outer clothing, noticing

-2-
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a hard cylindrical object in defendant's left front pocket. Although Officer Morgan did not believe
the object was a gun, he was concerned that he was feeling the handle of a knife. Because he could
not readily determine whether the object was a weapon, Officer Morgan removed the object from
the defendant's pocket. As he removed the object, a baggie containing a crystal substance also fell
out of the defendant's pocket. At this point, Officer Morgan saw that the object was a prescription
medication bottle, and his initial impression of the baggie was that it contained methamphetamine.
5.

The crystal substance field tested positive for methamphetamine and weighed 1.16

grams. The defendant admitted buying the methamphetamine from Lamoreaux just before officers
arrived. His written statement is attached hereto.
6.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine on July 25, 2008.
ARGUMENT

Defendant's motion to suppress should be denied because the discovery of the
methamphetamine did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.1 Deputy Taylor
initially detained the defendant in order to ensure his own safety and maintain control over the scene
because he was involved in a dangerous altercation with Lamoreaux. The defendant's behavior
when the butterfly knife was removed from Lamoreaux's person gave Officer Morgan reasonable
suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk for weapons.

Finally, Officer Morgan discovered the

!

The defendant also cites the Utah State Constitution (Defendant's Motion at page 1), but
provides no separate analysis under the State constitution and cites cases applying the federal
analysis. The State therefore addresses only the federal constitutional claim.
-3-

b

